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RACE AND THE VICTIM: AN EXAMINATION OF CAPITAL
SENTENCING AND GUILT ATTRIBUTION STUDIES
CYNTHIA K.Y. LEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, two criminal cases captured the attention of the
American public. Both cases involved interracial violence. Both re-
sulted in verdicts that outraged a sizable percentage of the American
populace. In both cases, public attention focused on the racial similar-
ity between the jurors and the defendants.
On October 3, 1995, O.J. Simpson, an African-American football
celebrity, was found not guilty of murdering his ex-wife, Nicole Brown
Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman, both White, by a predomi-
nantly African-American jury. Many people expressed disbelief and
outrage at the verdict. In large part, this outrage arose out of the be-
lief that the verdict was the product of a predominantly Black jury
acquitting one of its own.' Many criticized Los Angeles District At-
torney Gil Garcetti for not trying the case in Santa Monica, where the
jury pool would have been different than the jury pool in downtown
Los Angeles, because they felt that a jury composed of more Whites
(or fewer Blacks) 2 would have viewed the evidence more impartially
and then convicted Simpson.3 For those unwilling to admit publicly
that they thought the Simpson jurors were racially biased in favor of
Simpson, the shortness of the deliberation process became the pub-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.A., Stanford
University. J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law. I thank John Cotsirilos, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Loring
Jones, Richard McAdams, Elizabeth Missakian, Janice Nadler, and Paul Wohlmuth for input on
prior drafts and/or conversations about this work. I also thank Karen Heumann, David Kim,
and Shannon O'Brien for valuable research assistance.
1. See Richard A. Boswell, Crossing the Racial Divide: Challenging Stereotypes About
Black Jurors, 6 HAsTINGs WOMEN'S L.J. 233 (1995) (criticizing the widely held perception that a
jury composed mostly of Blacks would be unable to find a Black defendant guilty).
2. I capitalize "Black" and "White" in this essay to highlight the fact that Blacks and
Whites, like Asian Americans and Latinos, are members of socially constructed racial groups in
American society. See IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUcION OF
RACE (1995); cf. Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 n.6 (1991) (explaining her
decision to capitalize "Black" but not "white" because "Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other
'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper
noun" whereas whites do not constitute a specific cultural group).
3. See Martin Berg, DA Defends Simpson Call, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 17, 1995, at 2.
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licly stated reason for dismay over the verdict.4 Racial stereotypes
about Blacks being less intelligent and less competent than non-
Blacks constituted the subtext underlying much of the criticism of the
verdict and subsequent cries for reform of the jury system.5
On April 29, 1992, four White Los Angeles police officers were
acquitted by a predominantly White jury of charges of excessive force,
assault, and falsifying police reports, stemming from the brutal beating
of Rodney King, an African-American male, captured on home
video.6 The officers claimed the beating was justified because they
"reasonably" feared King was on PCP and posed an imminent threat
of danger.7 Following the verdict of acquittal, angry groups took to
the streets and rioted. 8 Even those who did not riot were shocked at
the verdict because it was widely believed that the predominantly
White jury with no Black representation was racially biased in favor of
the White police officer defendants. 9 When the case was retried in
federal court before a jury with at least two African Americans, two of
the officers were convicted of violating King's civil rights. 10
The not guilty verdicts in the Simpson and Rodney King beating
cases often are explained by reference to the presence of juror-de-
fendant racial similarity. The verdicts might also be explained by the
races of the victims and the absence (or notable lack) of juror-victim
racial similarity." This essay examines race-of-the-victim effects in
4. See Robert A. Jordan, No Victory, No Defeat, Only an Angry Racial Divide, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 8, 1995, at A35.
5. See id.
6. See Tom Dresslar, State Civil Rights Law Is Weighed As Possible Remedy in King Case,
L.A. DAILY J., May 6, 1992, at 3 (noting that the four police officers were acquitted on April 29,
1992 of charges of excessive force, assault, and falsifying police reports in the March 3, 1991
beating of Rodney King); see also Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating
Acquitted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at Al ("The not guilty verdicts by a Ventura County Supe-
rior Court jury-which included no blacks-were reached after seven days of deliberations.").
7. See Claire Spiegel, Dangers of PCP May Play Part in L.A. Beating Trial, S.F. CHRONI-
CLE, June 18, 1991, at A7; Claire Speigel, Effects of PCP: Myth v. Reality, L.A. TIMES, June 17,
1991, at 1.
8. See Serrano & Wilkinson, supra note 6.
9. For a critique of the common perception that the Simi Valley verdict was an act of jury
nullification, see Kimberl Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, in READING ROD-
NEY KING\READING URBAN UPRISING 56 (1993), which explains how seemingly neutral and ob-
jective concepts like "reasonable force" are mediated through racial narratives.
10. See Jim Newton, Racially Mixed Jury Selected for King Trial, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1993,
at Al (noting that the jury selected for the federal trial included "two African-Americans and
one Latino-in contrast to last year's state trial of the same four defendants, when the jury
included no blacks"); Ted Rohrlick, Tempers Flared, Emotions Ran High for King Jury, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at Al (reporting that the jury in the federal civil rights trial found defend-
ants Laurence M. Powell and Stacey C. Koon guilty of violating King's civil rights, but returned
not guilty verdicts for defendants Timothy E. Wind and Theodore J. Briseno).
11. In the Simpson case, only two of the jurors shared racial affinity with the victims, Nicole
Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman. Nine of the twelve jurors were Black, two were Cauca-
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capital and non-capital cases from a positive, rather than a normative,
perspective. 12 A large body of research on race and capital sentencing
indicates that the race of the victim is a significant factor linked to
imposition of the death penalty. 13 Part II of this essay examines these
capital sentencing studies. These studies indicate that offenders al-
leged to have killed White victims are more likely to be charged with
special circumstances supporting the death penalty and more likely to
receive a sentence of death than offenders alleged to have killed Black
victims.
Whether the race of the victim influences the determination of
guilt in non-capital cases is not as clear. Rather than looking at the
race of the victim in isolation, the few social scientists who have con-
sidered the issue have looked at the race of the victim in conjunction
with the race of the juror to determine whether juror-victim racial
similarity has any influence on the determination or attribution of
guilt.14 Relatively few studies have been conducted on juror-victim
racial similarity and guilt attribution when compared to the number of
studies on juror-defendant racial similarity.15 Studies examining ju-
ror-victim racial similarity and guilt attribution published prior to 1985
indicate that juror-victim racial similarity has a statistically significant
sian (or White), and one was Hispanic. See Harvey A. Silverglate, Simpson Jury Sends a Subtle
Message on Race, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1995, at A21. In the first Rodney King beating trial, none
of the jurors shared racial affinity with the victim, Rodney King, a Black man. See Serrano &
Wilkinson, supra note 6 (noting that the jury included no Blacks).
12. Elsewhere I have suggested reforms to deal with the influence of race upon jury deci-
sionmaking. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Concep-
tion of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (proposing limiting instruction permitting
jurors to race-switch in cases involving claims of self-defense).
13. See infra Part II. I do not claim to have presented an exhaustive survey of all the capital
sentencing studies that exist.
14. See infra Part III. I do not claim to have presented an exhaustive survey of all the guilt
attribution studies on juror-victim racial similarity that could possibly exist.
15. See, e.g., J.L. Bernard, Interaction Between the Race of the Defendant and That of Jurors
in Determining Verdicts, 5 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 103 (1979); Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Cham-
blin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock Jurors' Decisions, 112 J. PSYCHOL. 47 (1982);
Randall A. Gordon, Attributions for Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effects of Subject
and Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 971 (1990);
Randall A. Gordon et al., Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effect of De-
fendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 191 (1988); Jack P. Lipton,
Racism in the Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant, 5 HISPANIC J. BEHAV. Sci. 275 (1983); Richard
P. McGlynn et al., Sex and Race as Factors Affecting the Attribution of Insanity in a Murder Trial,
93 J. PSYCHOL. 93 (1976); J.L. Miller et al., Perceptions of Justice: Race and Gender Differences in
Judgments of Appropriate Prison Sentences, 20 L. & Soc. REV. 313 (1976); Charlan Nemeth &
Ruth Hyland Sosis, A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of the Defendant and the Jurors, 90 J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 221 (1973). Similarly, with the exception of Sheri Lynn Johnson's article, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985), few law review articles have fo-
cused on the effect of juror-victim racial similarity on guilt attribution.
19981
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effect on guilt attribution. 16 Studies published after 1985 have
reached the opposite conclusion.' 7 Part III of this essay summarizes
the existing research on juror-victim racial similarity and guilt attribu-
tion. Part IV critiques the methodological design of these studies, and
concludes that further research on juror-victim racial similarity and
guilt attribution should be conducted.
II. RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: CAPITAL SENTENCING
STUDIES
A large body of research conducted on race and capital sentenc-
ing indicates that the race of the victim is a significant factor linked to
imposition of the death penalty, with offenders convicted of killing
White victims more likely to be charged with capital murder (a
prosecutorial decision) and more likely to receive the death penalty
(generally a jury decision) than offenders convicted of killing Black
victims. There is also some evidence that defendants charged with
killing White victims are more likely to be charged with special cir-
cumstances than defendants charged with killing Latino victims. 18
The most comprehensive study on race and capital sentencing is
the Baldus study, conducted during the 1970s by David Baldus,
George Woodworth, and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr.' 9 Baldus, Wood-
worth, and Pulaski examined over 2,000 capital murder cases in Geor-
gia and found that a defendant charged with killing a White person
was 8.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than a defend-
16. See infra Part III.A (discussing guilt attribution studies indicating strong race-of-the vic-
tim effect). For a detailed examination of guilt attribution studies published prior to 1985, see
Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, supra note 15.
17. See infra Part III.B (discussing guilt attribution studies indicating little or no race-of-
the-victim effect).
18. See Robert Garcia, Crime and Justice: Latinos and Criminal Justice, 14 CHIcANo-LA-
TIN O L. REV. 6, 14 (1994) ("Offenders who were charged with having killed an Anglo were
fourteen times more likely to be charged with special circumstances than offenders who were
charged with having killed a Latino") (citing study conducted by Professor Richard Berk, Direc-
tor, Center for the Study of the Environment and Society, University of California, Los Angeles
(Aug. 12, 1992) (on file with Garcia)).
19. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences:
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). Ran-
dall Kennedy has characterized the Baldus study as "the most complete and thorough analysis of
sentencing that [has] ever been done." Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1399 (1988) (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at 67, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811)). Others have heralded
Baldus's work as "among the best empirical studies on criminal sentencing ever conducted." Id.
at 1400 (quoting Brief Amici Curiae for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher et al. in Support of Petitioner
Warren McCleskey at 3, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (No. 84-6811)).
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ant charged with killing a Black person.20 When the cases were di-
vided according to the race of the defendant and the race of the
victim, Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski found that juries imposed the
death penalty in 22% of the cases involving Black defendants and
White victims; 8% of the cases involving White defendants and White
victims; 3% of the cases involving White defendants and Black vic-
tims; and only 1% of the cases involving Black defendants and Black
victims. 21 Even after controlling for thirty-nine nonracial variables,
Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski found that capital defendants con-
victed of killing White victims were 4.3 times more likely to be con-
demned to death than those convicted of killing Blacks.22
Even greater disparities appeared in the exercise of prosecutorial,
as opposed to jury, discretion. Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski found
that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involv-
ing Black defendants and White victims; 32% of the cases involving
White defendants and White victims; 19% of the cases involving
White defendants and Black victims; and 15% of the cases involving
Black defendants and Black victims. 23 The race of the victim, more
than any other factor, was the most significant factor influencing both
the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty and the jury's deci-
sion to impose a death sentence.24
20. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 19, at 314.
21. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987). In McCleskey, the petitioner, a Black
man convicted of killing a White police officer, tried to use the Baldus study to overturn his
death sentence. The Supreme Court denied McCleskey's petition, holding that the Baldus study
was insufficient proof that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case had acted with dis-
criminatory purpose. See id. at 297. While some have interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling in
McCleskey as a repudiation of the Baldus study, the Court did not question the validity of the
study: "As did the Court of Appeals, we assume the study is valid statistically without reviewing
the factual findings of the District Court." Id. at 291 n.7; see also Kennedy, supra note 19, at
1400-01 (noting that both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court assumed the validity of
the Baldus study). The McCleskey opinion has been widely criticized by legal academics and
others. See, e.g., Norval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence Is There that Race Influences
Results in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDICATURE 111 (1988); Kennedy, supra note 19, at
1389 ("I, too, believe that both the Court's ruling and the way it was articulated are grievously
flawed."); Bryan A. Stevenson & Ruth E. Friedman, Deliberate Indifference: Judicial Tolerance
of Racial Bias in Criminal Justice, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 509, 509 (1994) (calling the McCles-
key opinion a "deeply disturbing opinion about race and the administration of criminal justice in
the United States"); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 149,
158 (1987) (describing the opinion as "logically unsound, morally reprehensible, and legally
unsupportable").
22. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
23. See id.
24. Baldus also found that Black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death
sentence than other defendants. See id. Later research by Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski
suggested, however, that the race of the defendant did not significantly influence the decision
whether to impose the death penalty. See David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimina-
1998]
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The Baldus study is consistent with a large body of research.2 5 In
1989, Samuel Gross and Robert Mauro published the results of a
study examining capital sentencing under post-Furman death penalty
statutes in eight states: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, North
Carolina, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Virginia.26 In each of these
states, Gross and Mauro found a statistically significant disparity be-
tween killers of Whites and killers of Blacks, with killers of Whites
receiving the death penalty at a much higher rate than killers of
Blacks.27
tion in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON
L. REV. 133, 158 (1986).
25. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL Dis-
PARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989) (finding in each of eight states studied that killers of
Whites were more likely than killers of Blacks to receive the death penalty); William J. Bowers
& Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 577 (1980) (studying death sentences during the five years following the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia in Florida, Georgia, Ohio, and Texas, which
were responsible for roughly 70% of all death sentences imposed nationwide during this period,
and finding in all four states that the race of the victim was an important determinant of sen-
tence, with Black offender-White victim cases most likely to result in the death penalty); Samuel
R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sen-
tencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 105 (1984) [hereinafter Gross &
Mauro, Patterns of Death] (examining capital sentencing in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia between 1976 and 1980 and finding dis-
crimination based on the race of the victim in each of these states); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F.
Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: An Analysis of Post-Gregg Out-
comes, 7 JUST. Q. 189 (1990) (finding that even after controlling for the heinousness of the mur-
der, prior criminal record, and the personal relationship between the victim and the offender,
Blacks accused of killing Whites had a higher than average probability of being charged with
capital murder and sentenced to death); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race, Homicide
Severity, and Application of the Death Penalty: A Consideration of the Barnett Scale, 27 CRIMI-
NOLOGY 511, 511 (1989) [hereinafter Keil & Vito, Race, Homicide Severity and Application of the
Death Penalty] (finding that even after controlling for the seriousness of the offense, the impact
of race was still significant because Blacks who killed whites were still more likely to receive the
death penalty); Michael L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Pen-
alty, 46 Am. Soc. REV. 918, 921-22 (1981) (studying over 600 homicides in twenty Florida coun-
ties between 1976 and 1977 and finding that defendants who kill whites are more likely to be
sentenced to death than defendants who kill Blacks); Jonathan R. Sorensen & Donald H. Wal-
lace, Capital Punishment in Missouri: Examining the Issue of Racial Disparity, 13 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 61, 72 (1995) (finding that Blacks who kill whites are nearly four times as likely as Whites
who kill Blacks to be charged and convicted of capital murder). But cf Gary Kleck, Racial
Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional
Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 783, 792 (1981) [hereinafter Kleck, Racial
Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing] (acknowledging that Black offender-White victim crimes
are punished more severely than crimes with other combinations, but questioning whether this
disparity is due to the racial character of the crime or to other factors); A Study of the California
Penalty Jury in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297, 1366-67 (1969) (finding that
neither the race of the defendant nor the race of the victim were associated with the imposition
of the death penalty).
26. GRoss & MAURO, supra note 25, at 35 (examining all homicides reported to the FBI
from the eight listed states between January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1980).
27. See id. at 43-87 (racial patterns in capital sentencing in Georgia, Florida, and Illinois)
and 88-94 (racial patterns in capital sentencing in Oklahoma, North Carolina, Mississippi, Vir-
ginia, and Arkansas).
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The three states with the largest numbers of death sentences were
Georgia, Florida, and Illinois. 28 In these states, even after controlling
for the effects of nonracial variables, such as the commission of a sep-
arate felony, the relationship between the victim and the offender, and
the number of victims, Gross and Mauro still found that killing a
White victim increased the odds of a death sentence by a factor of
four in Illinois, about five in Florida, and about seven in Georgia.29 In
other words, in Illinois, the odds of an offender receiving the death
penalty for killing a White were four times greater than for killing a
Black. 30 In Florida, the odds of an offender receiving the death pen-
alty for killing a White victim were 4.8 times greater than for killing a
Black victim. 31 In Georgia, the odds of receiving the death penalty for
killing a White victim were approximately 7.2 times greater than for
killing a Black victim. 32
In 1989, Thomas Keil and Gennaro Vito published the results of
their study of the capital sentencing process in Kentucky.33 After con-
trolling for the level of seriousness of the offense, Keil and Vito found
that Blacks who killed Whites were more likely to be charged with
capital murder and sentenced to death than any other offender.34 In
1990, Keil and Vito published the results of a second study that used
the same data set as the first study, but controlled for differences in
prior criminal record and the personal relationship between the of-
fender and victim, in addition to the heinousness of the offense. 35
Again, Keil and Vito found that Blacks who killed Whites were more
likely to be charged with capital murder than Whites who killed
Whites, Blacks who killed Blacks, and Whites who killed Blacks, and
that Blacks who killed Whites were most likely to receive a death sen-
tence from the jury.36
28. See id. at 39.
29. See id. at 69. In each of the five remaining states (Oklahoma, North Carolina, Missis-
sippi, Virginia, and Arkansas), even after controlling for nonracial variables, Gross and Mauro
found that White victim homicides were more likely to result in death sentences than Black
victim homicides. See id. at 92.
30. See id. at 66.
31. See id. at 65.
32. See id. at 66.
33. See Keil & Vito, Race, Homicide Severity, and Application of the Death Penalty, supra
note 25 (studying murder cases in Kentucky during a ten year period between December 22,
1976 through October 1, 1986).
34. See id. at 527.
35. See Keil & Vito, Race and the Death Penalty, supra note 25.
36. See id. at 197, 203.
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In 1995, Jonathan Sorensen and Donald Wallace published the
results of a study of capital sentencing in Missouri.37 Sorensen and
Wallace found that Blacks who killed Whites were nearly four times
as likely as Whites who killed Blacks to be charged with and convicted
of capital murder.38
One recent study stands in opposition to these consistent findings
regarding the effect of the race of the victim on the capital charging
and sentencing process. In 1991, Stephen Klein and John Rolph pub-
lished the results of their study of homicides committed in California
after August 10, 1977 (the date California's current death penalty law
took effect) for which the offender was under a sentence of death or
life in prison without the possibility of parole as of March 1, 1984. 39
Contrary to the substantial body of research that has found the race of
the victim to be a statistically significant factor in charging and sen-
tencing of capital cases, Klein and Rolph found that the race of the
victim was not a statistically significant factor in the imposition of the
death penalty.40 The Klein and Rolph study did not purport to ad-
dress the spectrum of capital charging and sentencing, but focused
only on the sentencing decision.41
The methodological design of Klein and Rolph's study might be
critiqued for sample selection bias because the sample of cases se-
lected by Klein and Rolph may not have been adequate to measure
racial bias in the administration of the death penalty. The problem of
"sample selection bias" in capital sentencing studies occurs when re-
searchers examine the jury's decision to impose the death penalty
from a limited selection of cases in which the defendant has been
charged and convicted of a capital offense. Bias occurs because deci-
sions influenced by race made earlier in the process, such as
prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions, may mask the racial
effects of later decisions.42 Because racial factors may influence deci-
sions at different stages of the process, a study that considers only
those persons sentenced to death might not reflect racial effects occur-
ring at earlier stages, such as the prosecutor's decision to seek the
37. See Sorensen & Wallace, supra note 25.
38. See id. at 72.
39. See Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Relationship of Offender and Victim Race to
Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 37 (1991).
40. See id. at 42 ("Within each cluster, the death sentencing rate for white victim cases did
not differ in a statistically significant way from the rate for nonwhite victim cases.").
41. See id. at 44.
42. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. No. GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SEN-
TENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 1990), reprinted in 136
CONG. REc. S6889-90 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) [hereinafter U.S. GAO].
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death penalty.43 Klein and Rolph limited their database to capital
cases in which there were convictions and limited their study to the
jury's decision whether to impose death or life without the possibility
of parole, 44 thus deleting from their sample any examination of the
impact of the race of either the victim or the defendant on the prose-
cutor's charging decision.
Klein and Rolph acknowledged this limitation:
Our research dealt with the issue of possible racial bias in sentenc-
ing. It focused on just the cases for which a death penalty could be
legally imposed; i.e. offenders convicted of crimes with special cir-
cumstances. We did not examine possible bias at earlier stages such
as police investigation and arrest practices, prosecutor charging deci-
sions, case preparation, jury verdicts regarding guilt or innocence,
and prosecutor requests for the death penalty. Bias at any of these
stages could affect which cases reach the point at which a death/[life
without possibility of parole] decision is made.45
In 1990, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") published the
results of its examination of all relevant empirical studies on race and
capital sentencing conducted after the Furman decision in 1972.46 The
GAO found that in 82% of the relevant studies, the race of the victim
influenced the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or re-
ceiving the death penalty.47 The GAO noted that this finding was "re-
markably consistent across data sets, states, data collection methods,
and analytic techniques. '48
A number of scholars have offered various explanations for the
disparity in the imposition of the death penalty based on the race of
the victim. Some have argued that interracial crimes are perceived as
particularly threatening to the social order and, therefore, are pun-
43. See id.
44. See Klein & Rolph, Death Penalty Sentences in California, supra note 39, at 33.
45. Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
46. See U.S. GAO, supra note 42, at S6889-90. First, the researchers identified and col-
lected all potentially relevant studies done at national, state, and local levels from both published
and unpublished sources. Computer generated bibliographic searches and manual reviews of the
bibliographies of studies obtained contributed to their list of potentially relevant material. Re-
searchers also surveyed twenty-one criminal justice researchers and directors of relevant organi-
zations whose work relates to death penalty sentencing. They screened over 200 annotated
citations and references to determine relevance. They excluded studies that were based primar-
ily on data collected prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and which did not examine
race as a factor that might influence death penalty sentencing. From this initial screening, re-
searchers obtained fifty-three studies that they determined to be relevant. Researchers then
reviewed these fifty-three studies to determine appropriateness and quality. They excluded stud-
ies that did not contain empirical data or that were duplicative. Twenty-eight studies remained
after this screening. See id. at S6889.
47. See id.
48. Id.
1998]
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ished more harshly. 49 The problem with this theory is that it does not
explain why Whites who kill Whites (i.e., intraracial homicides) are
more likely to receive the death penalty than Whites who kill Blacks
(i.e., interracial homicides). 50 Others have argued more persuasively
that prosecutors with limited resources must choose to pursue only
those homicides that are disturbing to the majority of the community,
and homicides with White victims are the homicides that the majority
finds disturbing.51 Along the same lines, some have speculated that
prosecutors may believe it is easier to win a conviction before an all-
White or mostly White jury when the victim is White than when the
victim is Black. 52 Some have argued that the explanation for this phe-
nomenon has nothing to do with race. "When a murder involves peo-
ple of different races, it is more likely that the victim and the killer are
strangers, and such murders tend to be of the kinds where [sic] the
death penalty applies. '53 Others have argued that the capital sentenc-
ing studies reflect the fact that society as a whole cares less about
Black victims than White victims and devalues Black victims' lives.54
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF
JUROR-VICTIM RACIAL SIMILARITY ON GUILT
ATTRIBUTION
In addition to the research conducted on race and capital sen-
tencing, some social scientists have found that the race of the victim
has a statistically significant effect on guilt attribution. Others have
reached contrary results. This section summarizes some of the re-
search that has been conducted on juror-victim racial similarity and
guilt attribution.
49. See Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death, supra note 25, at 106 (citing Hans Zeisel, Race
Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REv., 456,
467-68 (1981)).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 106-07; see also Zeisel, supra note 49, at 467 ("Public opinion is more likely to
be aroused if the victim is White.. . these cases are more likely to receive greater media atten-
tion, making it more difficult for the prosecutor to offer a deal.").
52. See Keil & Vito, Race and the Death Penalty, supra note 25, at 204.
53. J. Daryl Charles, Justice By Quota, NAT'L REV., Sept. 12, 1994, at 76.
54. See Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death, supra note 25, at 107 (citing Kleck, Racial Dis-
crimination in Criminal Sentencing, supra note 25, at 800); Bowers & Pierce, supra note 25, at
573-74.
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A. Studies Indicating Strong Race-of-the-Victim Effect 55
1. Miller and Hewitt (1978)
In 1978, Marina Miller and Jay Hewitt published the results of a
study testing the reactions of 133 university students (eighty-three wo-
men, approximately half of whom were Black and half of whom were
White, and fifty men, half of whom were Black and half of whom were
White). 56 The students were told to pretend they were jurors and then
were shown a videotape of a court case involving a Black defendant
charged with raping a thirteen-year-old girl.5 7 Half the students were
told that the victim was Black and half were told that she was White.58
Miller and Hewitt found that both Black and White students
tended to convict more often when they shared racial affinity with the
victim. Sixty-five percent of the White students voted for conviction
when they thought the victim was White, but only thirty-two percent
voted for conviction when they thought the victim was Black.5 9
Eighty percent of the Black students voted for conviction when they
thought the victim was Black, but only forty-eight percent voted for
conviction when they thought the victim was White.60
2. Ugwuegbu (1979)
In 1979, Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu published the results of
two sets of experiments, one with White participants and the other
with Black participants, assessing the behavior of jurors in the deci-
sionmaking process. 61 In the first experiment, 256 White undergradu-
55. For a comprehensive discussion of the pre-1985 guilt attribution studies, see Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, supra note 15.
56. See Marina Miller & Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-
Victim Racial Similarity, 105 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 159, 159-60 (1978).
57. See id. at 160.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of
Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 133 (1979). In both experiments,
students were asked to complete or respond to the following statements with one of the indi-
cated responses:
(1) I feel that the defendant's intention was to cause the plaintiff, Miss Brown: (No
harm at all, Some harm, Extreme harm.)
(2) To what extent was Mr. Williams, the defendant, responsible for the rape? (Not at
all responsible, Moderately responsible, Very much responsible.)
(3) With respect to my verdict, I feel the defendant is guilty as charged (Not guilty of
any crime, Moderately guilty as charged, Exactly guilty as charged.)
(4) Based on the evidence, I feel I would recommend for the defendant as punishment
(No punishment at all; Suspended sentence; 1-5 years in the State Prison; 5-9 years; 10-
14 years; 15-20 years; Over twenty years but not life; Life imprisonment; Death
penalty.)
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ate students in introductory psychology classes at a Midwestern
university read a transcript of a simulated rape case that occurred on a
college campus. 62 The racial identities of the victim and defendant
and the amount of evidence presented to the jurors were varied.63
Students filled out pre-deliberation questionnaires based on their indi-
vidual assessments of the evidence. 64 The students then deliberated in
groups of twelve.65 In the second experiment, 196 Black undergradu-
ates at the African-American Affairs Institute were similarly tested.66
Ugwuegbu's findings were similar to Miller and Hewitt's findings.
The responses indicated that the student-jurors felt the defendant was
more culpable when the students shared racial affinity with the victim
than when they lacked such affinity. 67 White students believed the
defendant was more culpable when the victim was White than when
the victim was Black.68 Black students believed the defendant was
more culpable when the victim was Black than when the victim was
White. 69
Additionally, Ugwuegbu's findings mirrored the findings of the
Baldus study and other capital sentencing studies. White students
thought Black defendants who raped White victims were more culpa-
ble than White defendants who raped Black victims, White defendants
who raped White victims, and Black defendants who raped Black vic-
tims. 70 Ugwuegbu concluded that the race of the victim inappropri-
ately influenced the level of culpability that the student-jurors
ascribed to the defendant. 71
3. Klein and Creech (1982)
In 1982, Kitty Klein and Blanche Creech published the results of
two experiments on race and guilt attribution.72 In the first experi-
ment, sixty-five White male and thirty-nine White female students
served as subjects in return for credit in their introductory psychology
Id. at 137-38.
62. See id. at 136, 137.
63. See id. at 135.
64. See id. at 136-37.
65. See id. at 137.
66. See id. at 141.
67. See id. at 139, 141.
68. See id. at 139.
69. See id. at 141.
70. See id. at 139.
71. See id. at 143.
72. Kitty Klein & Blanche Creech, Race, Rape and Bias: Distortion of Prior Odds and
Meaning Changes, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 21 (1982).
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class. 73 Four crimes (rape, murder, sale of drugs, and burglary) were
presented in pairs to the students. 74 The races of the male defendant
and the female victim were systematically varied.75 The students were
asked to rate which defendant they thought was more likely to be
guilty.76 This study revealed that for the crimes of rape, murder, and
burglary, regardless of the race of the defendant, the students thought
the defendant was more likely to be guilty when the victim was White
than when the victim was Black. 77 When the offense charged was the
sale of drugs, the race of the victim did not have a significant impact
on the students' guilt ratings.78
In the second experiment, sixty-five White male and sixty-eight
White female students served as subjects. 79 The students were shown
a videotape of a rape trial in which the defendant's race and the vic-
tim's race were varied (Black or White). 80 The students were then
asked to answer questions regarding the defendant's guilt and the ap-
propriate punishment. 81 While there were no significant differences in
responses as to the defendant's guilt, White male subjects recom-
mended the harshest punishment for Black male defendants convicted
of raping White female victims. 82 Both male and female students rec-
ommended the most lenient punishment for White defendants con-
victed of raping Black females. 83
In each of these three studies, researchers found that the race of
the victim had a statistically significant impact on juror determinations
of guilt or punishment. White student-jurors found the defendant
guilty more often, thought the defendant was more culpable, or pun-
ished the defendant more severely when the victim was White than
when the victim was Black. Conversely, Black student-jurors found
the defendant guilty more often, believed the defendant was more cul-
73. See id. at 23.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 24.
78. See id. Perhaps the race of the victim was not significant when the crime was a drug
offense because drug offenses are often viewed as victimless crimes. In contrast, rape, murder,
and burglary are crimes with definite victims or persons harmed by the criminal act.
79. See id. at 26.
80. See id. at 25, 27.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 28-29.
83. See id. at 29.
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pable, or punished the defendant more severely when the victim was
Black than when the victim was White.84
B. Studies Indicating Race-of-the-Victim Has Little or No Effect on
Guilt Attribution
1. Poulson (1990)
In 1990, Ronald L. Poulson published the results of a test of 197
undergraduate students (ninety-six percent of whom were White; the
remaining four percent were Black and Asian) enrolled in introduc-
tory psychology classes at Northwestern University. 85 The students
were shown, by means of audiotape and a synchronized slide projec-
tor, a simulated insanity defense trial in which a male defendant
stabbed a female victim to death.86 The students were randomly as-
84. In 1989, Gary LaFree published the results of his study of actual rape cases processed
during the 1970s in Indianapolis, Indiana. GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1989). LaFree's study is not included in the text
of this section because it did not focus solely upon juror-victim racial similarity and guilt attribu-
tion. LaFree found that the race of the victim played a significant role in the processing of the
rape cases studied. See id. at 145, 219-20; see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Repre-
sentation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexual-
ity, 49 VAND. L. REv. 868, 880 (1996) (describing and analyzing LaFree's study). LaFree pointed
out that at the beginning of the process, Black defendant/Black victim cases were the largest
category of reported rape cases, White defendant/White victim cases were the second largest
category, and Black defendant/White victim cases constituted the smallest number of reported
rapes. See LAFREE, supra, at 133 (noting that Black men accused of assaulting Black women
accounted for 45% of all reported rapes, White intraracial assaults constituted 32.3% of all re-
ported rape cases, and Black men accused of assaulting White women accounted for 23% of all
reported rapes). White offender/Black victim cases were not included because there were only
eleven cases involving White offenders and Black women in the study. See id. at 129. As the
cases progressed from reporting of the crime to sentencing, however, the percentage of Black
defendant/White victim cases increased, the percentage of Black defendant/Black victim cases
decreased, and the percentage of White defendant/White victim cases remained about the same.
See id. at 133. Cases involving Black offenders and White victims also resulted in more substan-
tial penalties than other cases, while cases involving Black offenders and Black victims consist-
ently resulted in the least serious punishment. See id. at 145. These results indicate that the race
of the victim significantly influenced the cases that made it to trial. See id. The rape cases
involving White women victims were the ones that were believed to be important enough to try.
Lisa Iglesias points out that focusing solely on the defendant's race, not taking the victim's race
into account, "does not adequately account for bias in the processing of rape cases." Iglesias,
supra, at 881. Iglesias explains:
Indeed, if Black men committed approximately seventy percent of the reported rapes,
then the fact that they received the harshest sanction in seventy percent of the cases
belies any inference of discrimination. When the victim's race is factored into the anal-
ysis, however, these results suggest that the harsher treatment of Black men convicted
of interracial rape compensated for the more lenient treatment of Black men convicted
of intraracial rape. This disparity produces the appearance of proportionality.
Id. at 881-82.
85. See Ronald L. Poulson, Mock Juror Attribution of Criminal Responsibility: Effects of
Race and the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI) Verdict Option, 20 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1596,
1599 (1990).
86. See id.
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signed to different experimental conditions in which the race of the
defendant (Black or White), the race of the victim (Black or White),
and number of verdict alternatives (four choices: (1) GBMI,87 (2)
NGRI, 88 (3) guilty, and (4) not guilty vs. three choices: (1) NGRI, (2)
guilty, and (3) not guilty) were varied.89 The genders of the defendant
and victim were held constant. 90 Students were not allowed to discuss
their decisions with any other students.91 Poulson found that the race
of the victim did not significantly affect the student-jurors' verdict
assessments.
92
2. Rector, Bagby, and Nicholson (1993)
In February 1990, Neil A. Rector, R. Michael Bagby, and R.
Nicholson tested 245 students at a university in the southern United
States. 93 Ninety-one percent of the students were White, five percent
were Black, and five percent were racially identified as "other. ' 94 Stu-
dents were asked to assume the role of a juror, then read a partial
transcript from a rape trial.95 The races of the defendants and the
victims were varied in the transcript (White, Black, or not stipu-
lated).96 Half of the vignettes included jury instructions, while the
other half did not.97 Rector found that the race of the victim did not
significantly affect the students' decisionmaking; 98 rather, differences
in guilt attribution were mediated by the perceived attractiveness of
the defendant and victim, not their race.99
3. Hymes (1993)
In December 1990, Robert W. Hymes, Mary Leinart, Sandra
Rowe, and William Rogers tested fifty-four White male and forty-two
White female students enrolled in an introductory psychology course
87. "GBMI" stands for guilty but mentally ill.
88. "NGRI" stands for not guilty by reason of insanity.
89. See Poulson, supra note 85, at 1600.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1601.
93. See Neil A. Rector et al., The Effect of Prejudice and Judicial Ambiguity on Defendant
Guilt Ratings, 133 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 651, 653 (1993).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 657.
99. See id.
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at a Midwestern university. 1°° The students read legal briefs on an
acquaintance rape case, then responded to a questionnaire.' 0 ' The
races of the defendant and victim were varied to produce four combi-
nations (Black-White, Black-Black, White-White, and White-
Black). a°2
This study indicated that the students were more likely to find the
defendant guilty when the defendant's race differed from the victim's
race (i.e., interracial crimes), than when the defendant and the victim
were the same race (i.e., intraracial crimes). 10 3 Hymes and his col-
leagues concluded that this type of racial bias in jury decisionmaking
does not automatically place Blacks at a disadvantage.' °4
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING RESEARCH INDICATE NEED
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The existing research that has been conducted on the race of the
victim and jury decisionmaking leaves much to be desired. The empir-
ical studies on guilt attribution discussed in Part III raise questions of
ecological validity because none of the studies replicated actual jury
conditions.10 5 Unlike actual jurors, most student-jurors did not engage
in jury deliberations. Unlike actual jurors, the student-jurors did not
sit through a trial that would include oral argument from the attorneys
and live witness testimony. Instead, the student-jurors read portions
of transcripts, listened to audiotapes, or watched videotapes. All of
the studies utilized undergraduate students, most of whom were en-
rolled in introductory psychology courses. The students knew that
they were playing a role as mock jurors, which may have affected their
decisions. Being aware that they were participating in a simulated
study, student-jurors may have tried to give what they perceived to be
the socially desirable response. Additionally, the studies focused on
different issues. Some studies focused on guilt attribution. Others fo-
cused on sentencing. One examined mental illness. Another tested
100. See Robert W. Hymes et al., Acquaintance Rape: The Effect of Race of Defendant and
Race of Victim on White Juror Decisions, 133 J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 627, 630 (1993).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 631.
104. See id. at 632.
105. See Neil A. Rector & R. Michael Bagby, Criminal Sentence Recommendations in a Sim-
ulated Rape Trial: Examining Juror Prejudice in Canada, 13 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 113, 115 (1995).
But see Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, Socio-
economic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A Meta-
Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1335-36 (1994) (countering charge that mock juror
research is simplistic and lacks ecological validity).
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whether the failure to give jury instructions made a difference. These
differences may partially explain why the findings are inconsistent.
A. Absence of Jury Deliberation
In all of the studies (with the exception of Ugwuegbu's study in
which students engaged in deliberations), the subjects were asked in-
dividually how they would vote had they actually been on a jury. The
subjects did not engage in collective decisionmaking even though ac-
tual jury verdicts are a product of collective deliberation rather than
individual decisionmaking. Because the process of interacting with
other jurors can have a significant influence on a juror's final decision,
the absence of deliberation limits the reliability of these studies. 10 6
Professor J.L. Bernard contends that the level of simulation achieved
in many of the studies on jury decisionmaking has been unsatisfactory:
Research designs of jury studies frequently require 'jurors' to read a
written summary of a 'trial,' and to make individual judgments on
issues of the case. This procedure ... has little relation to the activi-
ties demanded of actual jurors. In short, the problem with many
jury studies is that what has been done in the laboratory simply does
not simulate what happens in the real world of the courtroom.
[Aictual jurors discuss the issues of the case, attempt to
alter each other's perceptions and misperceptions of the evidence,
argue logically (and illogically), cajole and insult one another, and
typically go through a series of ballots before arriving at a
verdict.' 0 7
Researchers defend studies focusing on individual juror decision-
making as opposed to collective jury decisionmaking on the ground
that deliberation in jury simulation research is not that important.
These researchers refer to a field study by the Chicago Jury Project to
support this view. That study indicated that the first ballot taken by
the jury is a strong predictor of jury verdicts. 10 8 One problem with
106. See Lipton, supra note 15, at 285 ("[I]ndividual juror characteristics cannot be consid-
ered in isolation since these variables interact with the characteristics of the jury as a whole.").
107. Bernard, supra note 15, at 104-05 (footnote omitted).
108. See Herman E. Mitchell & Donn Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of Jurors'
Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 123,
128 (1973) (noting that the absence of deliberation may not be that significant if members of the
jury make up their minds before they deliberate) (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 488 (1966)); see also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, supra
note 15, at 1698 (suggesting that unless at least three minority race jurors are on the jury, major-
ity race jurors will not be influenced by minority race jurors). But cf. Jeffrey E. Pfeifer & James
R.P. Ogloff, Ambiguity and Guilt Determinations: A Modern Racism Perspective, 21 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1713, 1722 (1991) ("Although it has been suggested that the deliberation process
plays a minimal role in affecting jurors [sic] preconceived decisions in general (Mitchell & Byrne,
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using this finding to support individualized mock juror decisionmak-
ing is that actual jurors often engage in extensive, collective discussion
before the first vote is taken.10 9 Because individual decisionmaking
and group decisionmaking are fundamentally different processes, 110
one should be hesitant to rely heavily on studies that test individual
juror decisionmaking to the exclusion of collective jury
decisionmaking.
B. Differences in the Level and Mode of Information Input
Another problem with the research reported in Part III involves
the amount of information given to mock jurors and the method of
disseminating such information to the mock jurors. Typically, trial
simulations provide less information to mock jurors than actual jurors
receive in real life trials."' Additionally, many simulations, including
some reported in Part III, provide mock jurors with written tran-
scripts, when in real life, jurors see and hear live testimony." 2
When mock jurors are given a written transcript, they may as-
sume that everything on the transcript is relevant. For example, mock
jurors presented with a written transcript that says, "John, a Black
man, is charged with raping Mary, a White woman," may assume that
the race and gender of the individuals described are relevant. When
jurors in real life sit through an actual case, they may notice the race
and gender of the defendant and victim, but not necessarily assume
that race and gender are relevant.
On the other hand, visual representations of race may be more
powerful than written descriptions. For example, in the Bernhard
Goetz trial,1" 3 the defense highlighted the race of the victims without
an overt appeal to race. George Fletcher, who observed the trial,
commented:
1973), it has yet to be demonstrated whether or not specific prejudicial attitudes are affected by
the deliberation process.").
109. See Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation
Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71, 78 (1979).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 77 ("The information input to the simulated jurors is minute in comparison to
that generally received by real jurors.").
112. See id.
113. Bernhard Goetz gained fame and notoriety when he shot four Black youths who had
asked him for five dollars on a New York subway. See Lee, Race and Self-Defense, supra note
12, at 416-19. One of the youths was paralyzed from a shot to the spinal cord. Goetz was
charged with assault, attempted murder, reckless endangerment, and illegal possession of a
weapon and was acquitted of all but the illegal possession charge. See id.
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Reading the record of the Goetz case, one hardly finds an explicit
reference to the race of anyone. But indirectly and covertly, the
defense played on the racial factor....
The covert appeal to racial bias came out most dramatically in the
re-creation of the shooting, played out while Joseph Quirk was testi-
fying. The defendant called in four props to stand in for the four
victims, Canty, Allen, Ramseur, and Cabey. The nominal purpose
of the demonstration was to show the way in which each bullet en-
tered the body of each victim. The defense's real purpose, however,
was to re-create for the jury, as dramatically as possible, the scene
that Goetz encountered when four young black passengers began to
surround him. For that reason Barry Slotnick asked the Guardian
Angels to send him four young black men to act as the props in the
demonstration. In came the four young black Guardian Angels, fit
and muscular, dressed in T-shirts, to play the parts of the four vic-
tims in a courtroom minidrama. 114
Moreover, actual jurors may pay considerable attention to the
nonverbal behavior of witnesses and other trial participants, factors
which cannot adequately be captured in a written transcript.115 For
these reasons, the studies conducted by Miller and Hewitt (1978),
Klein and Creech (second experiment) (1982), and Poulson (1990),
which utilized either a videotape or an audiotape with a synchronized
slide projector, may better reflect actual trial conditions than the stud-
ies which relied solely on written transcripts.
C. Problem of Role-Playing
Another problem with mock trial simulations is that mock jurors
deciding hypothetical questions in an experimental situation are not
subject to the pressures actual jurors face in real trials.116 "The simu-
lated juror knows that no real persons will be affected by his decision,
while the actual juror is acutely aware of the power of his decision to
alter a human's life."'1 17 It is extremely difficult to replicate the pres-
sures that actual jurors feel when their decisions can mean the differ-
ence between life and death or freedom and prison. Role-playing,
which represents the essence of the jury trial simulation paradigm,
114. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW
ON TRIAL 206-07 (1988).
115. See Weiten & Diamond, supra note 109, at 77.
116. See id. at 81 ("Perhaps the most critical difference between real and simulated jury
decisionmaking and the gap most difficult to close, is the difference in the consequences of the
two decision tasks.").
117. Id. (citing Cookie Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCHOL. 305, 311
(1974)).
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represents the subjects' guesses as to how they would behave if they
were in a given situation.118
Additionally, the results of these studies may have been influ-
enced by the perceived social desirability of certain responses over
others. The subjects were aware of their participation in a simulated
study. They may have tried to give what they perceived to be the
socially desired response. If this occurred, the results of the studies
may mask even stronger racial effects in real life. In actual trial situa-
tions, jurors may feel they can decide matters without accountability
because their vote is hidden by the votes of the other eleven jurors.
Moreover, in real life, jurors deliberate in secret, and ethical and evi-
dentiary rules prohibit post-verdict inquiry into the jury's deliberation
process. 1 9 If the jury returns a not guilty verdict, the acquittal cannot
be appealed. 20 Thus, actual jurors may feel less compulsion to re-
spond in socially desirable ways, particularly if they are not reminded
that it is important to do so.
D. University Students Not Representative of Actual Jury Pool
University students may not be representative of jurors in actual
trials.121 University students are typically better educated than actual
jurors and may pay closer attention to jury instructions given to them
by the court than actual jurors. 22 Some social science research indi-
cates that college students tend to be less conservative and less au-
thoritarian than the general adult population from which juries are
118. See id.
119. Rule 606 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits jurors from testifying about their
verdicts except under limited circumstances. Rule 606(b) provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the
juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the ques-
tion whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror.
FED. R. EvID. 606(b). This rule has been interpreted fairly strictly. In Tanner v. United States,
483 U.S. 107 (1987), the Court held that an evidentiary hearing in which jurors would testify
regarding juror alcohol and drug use during trial was barred by Rule 606(b).
120. The double jeopardy clause states "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
121. See Hubert S. Feild & Nona J. Barnett, Simulated Jury Trials: Students vs. "Real" People
as Jurors, 104 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 287, 287 (1978).
122. See Weiten & Diamond, supra note 109, at 76; see also Pfeifer & Ogloff, supra note 108,
at 1722 (noting that participants in study were college students who may have paid more atten-
tion to jury instructions than "actual" jurors might have); Rector & Bagby, supra note 105, at 114
(noting that a juror pool that is extremely well-educated is not representative of a typical juror
pool).
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drawn.1 23 One study found that college students were significantly
more lenient in sentencing than nonstudents. 124 Therefore, studies
utilizing university students as subjects may inadequately reflect how
actual jurors might act.
E. Exclusive Focus on Blacks and Whites
Another problem with the existing guilt attribution research is its
virtually exclusive focus on Blacks and Whites, both in terms of stu-
dent-subjects and the parties (defendants and victims) represented in
the simulated cases. While this focus is understandable in light of the
apparently small numbers of Asian Pacific Americans, Latino/as, and
Native Americans who actually serve on juries, it would be beneficial
if future researchers included other racial minorities in their studies.
F. Inconsistent Results
The criticisms detailed above indicate the need for social scien-
tists to conduct further research on juror-victim racial similarity and
guilt attribution. The fact that the results of the studies are inconsis-
tent provides additional support for this call for further research. 125
Three of the studies suggest that both Black and White jurors tend to
convict more often (or punish more severely) when they share racial
affinity with the victim. Three of the studies suggest that the race of
the victim is not a significant factor in juror decisionmaking.
Some might argue that the three most recent social science stud-
ies prove that race does not influence jury decisionmaking. The con-
clusion that race does not matter, however, is counterintuitive.
Additionally, such a conclusion contradicts research on social cogni-
tion which demonstrates that people tend to value those who are per-
ceived to be more like themselves (in-group favoritism) than others
who are perceived to be different (out-group antagonism). 126 Given
the numerous methodological problems common to all of the social
science studies outlined in this section, it would be premature to con-
clude either that the race of the victim influences jurors, or that it does
123. See Weiten & Diamond, supra note 109, at 76.
124. See Feild & Barnett, supra note 121, at 291.
125. Today, most Americans know and believe that racial prejudice is wrong. Therefore,
when faced with an obviously racial situation, most will strive to act in an egalitarian fashion.
Race of the victim disparity would be reflected in the older studies and not in the more recent
studies if it was more acceptable to hold prejudiced beliefs at that time than it is today.
126. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995).
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not. The only fair conclusion is that the studies are inconclusive and
further research must be conducted to resolve the question.
Even if additional research were to confirm the results of the
more recent studies, this would not necessarily eliminate the problem
of socially constructed racialized images which influence legal deci-
sionmaking in subtle and covert ways. All of the social science studies
testing the significance of the race of the victim treated race simply as
a physical fact, ignoring the socially constructed nature of race and the
ways in which racialized images of Blacks, Asian Americans, and Lati-
nos might affect legal decisionmaking. In real life, attorneys may ap-
peal to racial stereotypes covertly, using metaphors and images that
are not overtly racial.127 Jurors, who may not be aware of covert ap-
peals to race, may be influenced by racial bias even more than if the
appeal to race were obvious. None of the studies on juror-victim ra-
cial similarity and guilt attribution tested whether the covert exploita-
tion of racial stereotypes by attorneys influences jury decisionmaking.
Additional research is also warranted because different racial ste-
reotypes may attend different crimes and defenses.128 For example,
Poulson's 1990 study tested the influence of race on mock jurors in a
simulated insanity trial.1 29 The defense of insanity focuses on the de-
fendant's state of mind; the victim's characteristics, racial or other-
wise, have little influence on whether the defendant is able to know
right from wrong or conform her conduct to the requirements of the
law. Because racial stereotypes about Blacks being mentally ill are
not that common, it is not surprising that no significant race effects
were found when the defense at issue was insanity. It is possible that
people in general disfavor the insanity defense, regardless of the race
of the defendant or victim, because it is seen as an excuse easily
fabricated.
127. See supra text accompanying note 114.
128. One study found that Blacks were more likely than Whites to receive harsher punish-
ment for negligent homicide and Whites were more likely than Blacks to receive harsher punish-
ment for fraud. See Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 105, at 1325 (concluding that defendants
are treated more harshly when they commit crimes that are stereotypically associated with their
race). Another study found that crime related racial stereotypes exist. See Michael Sunnafrank
& Norman E. Fontes, General and Crime Related Racial Stereotypes and Influence on Juridic
Decisions, 17 CORNELL J. Soc. REL. 1 (1983) (concluding that certain crimes produce a juror
bias concerning the race of the individuals likely to commit the crime). Subjects attributed as-
sault-mugging, grand-theft auto, assault on a police officer, and soliciting more frequently to
Blacks than Whites. Fraud, embezzlement, child molestation, rape, and counterfeiting were at-
tributed to Whites more often than Blacks. See id.
129. See Poulson, supra note 85.
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The remaining guilt attribution studies utilized simulated rape tri-
als as the primary or only offense at issue. 130 Racial stereotypes about
Black sexuality, as opposed to racial stereotypes about Black criminal-
ity, may have influenced subject decisionmaking in these studies.131
Moreover, subjects in Hymes' 1993 study, which used acquaintance
rape as the offense, may have viewed interracial relationships as
anomalous and therefore less likely to be the predicate for a genuine
date rape situation. Additional research should be conducted testing
whether the race of the victim influences jurors in other types of cases,
such as homicide and assault cases.
For purposes of measuring the impact of the victim's race, the
capital sentencing studies, which are based on actual cases, may prove
more valuable than the social science studies conducted under labora-
tory conditions. The usual criticism with studies that rely on sentenc-
ing patterns to generalize about juror decisionmaking in guilt
determinations-that jurors generally do not determine
sentences132-is not applicable because jurors in capital cases do
choose which sentence should be imposed. Therefore, the capital sen-
tencing studies provide support for the notion that the race of the vic-
tim affects legal decisionmaking. Jurors in capital cases, knowing that
their decision means life or death, might try harder not to let race
influence their decisionmaking because the defendant's life is at
stake. 133 Jurors in non-capital cases generally do not know the possi-
130. See Hymes et al., supra note 100 (rape); Klein & Creech, supra note 72 (rape, murder,
sale of drugs, and burglary); Miller & Hewitt, supra note 56 (rape); Rector et al., supra note 93
(rape); Ugwuegbu, supra note 61 (rape).
131. See Hubert S. Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 264
(1979) (noting that sexual assailants of White women are likely to be treated more severely than
sexual assailants of Black women for two reasons: "(a) white women are viewed as the 'property'
of white men and must be protected from black men... ; and (b) the 'rape' of black women is
highly suspect; they may have received just what they wanted.").
132. See Neil Vidmar, The Other Issues in Jury Simulation Research, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
95, 96-97 (1979) (noting that jury simulation studies that use a measure of sentencing in lieu of a
verdict choice of guilty or not guilty ignore the fact that juries are rarely involved in sentencing).
133. Interestingly, jurors in federal death penalty cases are instructed not to recommend a
sentence of death unless they have concluded that they would recommend a sentence of death
for the crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or
gender of the defendant or victim. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1) (1994).
In any hearing held before a jury under this section, the court shall instruct the jury that
in its consideration of whether the sentence of death is justified it shall not consider the
race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or the victim, and
that the jury is not to recommend a sentence of death unless it has concluded that it
would recommend a sentence of death for the crime in question no matter what the
race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant, or the victim, may
be. The jury shall return to the court a certificate signed by each juror that considera-
tion of the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or the
victim was not involved in reaching his or her individual decision, and that the individ-
ual juror would have made the same recommendation regarding a sentence for the
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ble punishment that awaits the defendant who is found guilty. 134 Be-
cause of this lack of knowledge regarding the punishment, the non-
capital juror may not be as vigilant as the capital juror in attempting to
guard against the influence of racial bias.
Two arguments might be asserted by those who feel the capital
sentencing studies do not demonstrate that the race of the victim in-
fluences decisionmaking in non-capital cases. First, jurors deciding
sentencing matters generally consider a broader range of factors than
jurors deciding guilt or innocence. At sentencing, in both capital and
non-capital cases, evidence that might have been inadmissible at trial
is often considered. Capital jurors at sentencing have broad discretion
to consider any and all mitigating factors that might lead them to re-
ject death. 135 In contrast, jurors deciding guilt or innocence are gener-
ally instructed that they must find certain elements beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to convict. Theoretically, the discretion of
jurors deciding guilt or innocence in non-capital cases is much more
circumscribed than the discretion of jurors deciding punishment in
capital cases. In practice, however, when jurors in non-capital cases
are not instructed otherwise, they are permitted to consider extra-
legal factors such as race and their interpretation of the facts may be
influenced by racial considerations.1 36 Whether or not jurors in non-
capital cases in fact are influenced by the race of the victim, the fact
remains that the law as currently structured permits racial bias to op-
erate by the absence of a specific prohibition.
crime in question no matter what the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or
sex of the defendant, or the victim, may be.
Id.
134. Some courts instruct jurors that their job is solely to decide guilt or innocence and that
the court will determine the penalty. See, e.g., CALJIC No. 17.42 (6th ed. 1996) (instructing
jurors to "not discuss or consider the subject of penalty or punishment" in their deliberations).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has often stated, "It is well established that when a jury has no
sentencing function, it should be admonished to 'reach its verdict without regard to what sen-
tence might be imposed."' Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (citing Rogers v.
United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975)).
135. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-
14 (1982).
136. While California has a standard jury instruction that instructs jurors not to be swayed by
prejudice or emotion, there is no explicit instruction telling jurors not to allow racial stereotypes
to influence their decisionmaking. See CALJIC No. 1.00 (6th ed. 1996) ("You must not be influ-
enced by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feel-
ing."). The model federal jury instructions contain a similar instruction. See 1 HON. EDWARD J.
DEvrir ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACrICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §12.01 (4th ed. 1992) ("In deciding
the issues presented to you for decision in this trial you must not be persuaded by bias, prejudice,
or sympathy for or against any of the parties to this case or by any public opinion."). Perhaps
these model instructions could be modified to include an explicit reference to stereotypes based
on race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation as examples of types of stereotypes that might
lead to prejudice.
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Second, it might be argued that prosecutorial discretion in decid-
ing whether to seek the death penalty plays a large role in shaping the
types of cases that are charged as capital offenses and thus come
before the capital jury. That prosecutorial charging discretion plays a
significant role in determining which cases are prosecuted as death
penalty cases cannot be denied. Prosecutorial charging discretion,
however, also plays a significant role in shaping which non-capital
cases are prosecuted. As the capital sentencing studies indicate, pros-
ecutors, like jurors, are influenced by the race of the victim. There is
no evidence that prosecutors are not similarly influenced in non-capi-
tal cases.
Some might argue that the methodological problems noted in
Part IV are insurmountable because no study could ever precisely rep-
licate the exact same conditions encountered by actual jurors in actual
cases. I would not be so pessimistic. First, social scientists can and do
study actual trials. Second, trial simulations can and should be im-
proved by having mock jurors receive information in a manner more
similar to the manner that actual jurors receive information (e.g., via
videotape rather than written transcript), by measuring juror re-
sponses after collective or group deliberation, and by using voluntary
subjects from a cross-section of the community in addition to univer-
sity students. Jury consulting services currently replicate trial condi-
tions in this manner to determine which types of jurors would be best
for the prosecution or defense. Such trial simulations might be more
costly, but the results would be more reliable, and thus more useful.
V. CONCLUSION
Fundamental disagreement exists over the question whether the
race of the victim matters. On the one hand, the majority of capital
sentencing studies, three guilt attribution studies, social cognition re-
search, and intuition support an affirmative answer to this question.
On the other hand, there is no direct evidence that what happens in
capital cases also occurs in non-capital cases, three guilt attribution
studies indicate that the race of the victim does not matter, and intui-
tion is a far cry from hard proof that the race of the victim matters.
Rather than end the debate, these observations suggest the need for
further study.
Ultimately, racial differences in guilt attribution and punishment
may arise less from the presence or absence of racial affinity between
jurors and the defendant or victim than from the vastly different ways
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in which Whites, Blacks, and other minorities view everyday reality.137
During the Simpson trial, many Blacks were sympathetic to O.J.
Simpson and highly skeptical of the evidence against him because they
themselves had seen or personally experienced racial discrimination
by police officers or the judicial system. In contrast, many Whites
thought the evidence against Simpson constituted conclusive proof of
his guilt. This point of view may have been influenced by the fact that
many Whites have not experienced racial discrimination by police of-
ficers or the judicial system. Because of the vastly different exper-
iences of Whites and Blacks in American society, Black skepticism
about the evidence and White belief in Simpson's guilt may have ex-
isted even if the victims had been Black. This suggests that whether
the race of the victim influences jurors is only the first of a series of
questions that must be addressed in order to better understand the
role of race in criminal jury trials.
137. In speaking of Whites, Blacks, and other minorities, I do not claim that there is a unitary
or essential White, Black, or minority experience, whites, Blacks, and non-Black minorities
represent diverse and heterogenous individuals, differing in terms of gender, class, sexual orien-
tation, and disability.
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